Ready Room Blog
9/27/2024
Webinar: Road to Surrender with Evan Thomas
Evan Thomas is the bestselling author of eleven electrifying books, including The Wise Men (with Walter Isaacson), Robert Kennedy, Being Nixon, and his latest hit, Road to Surrender: Three Men and the Countdown to the End of World War II. With an incredible talent for turning history into a gripping narrative, Thomas has penned several New York Times bestsellers like John Paul Jones, Sea of Thunder, and First. As a veteran journalist with 33 years at Time and Newsweek, he shaped the nation’s political discourse, crafting over 100 cover stories and earning multiple National Magazine Awards. You’ve seen him on Meet the Press, The Colbert Report, and PBS’s Charlie Rose.
Due to time constraints, some questions went unanswered in the webinar.
These questions were submitted by attendees and answered after the webinar by Evan Thomas.
At the Potsdam Conference, President Truman spent significant time in close proximity to Joseph Stalin, whose aggressive actions in Eastern Europe reflected severe conflicts of interest. Given Stalin’s responsibility for millions of deaths within the Soviet regime, did he exert undue influence on Truman, potentially pressuring him into the decision to use nuclear bombs on Japanese cities? Shouldn’t there be a more thorough review of how Stalin’s manipulative tactics and conflicts of interest may have impacted Truman’s judgment during this critical moment, especially with Stalin promising to assist in the war against Japan? Could Stalin’s influence have shaped Truman’s decision, as Soviet leaders have historically attempted to manipulate U.S. officials?
There is no evidence that Stalin manipulated Truman. Initially, the U.S. wanted Russia to come into the war to attack Japan, but by July-August—once America knew it had the bomb—Russia was no longer needed. Indeed, we wanted to keep Russia out of Japan. At Potsdam, Truman mentioned the bomb almost in passing to Stalin, who already knew about it from Soviet spies at Los Alamos.
Is there any concrete evidence that President Truman or his close advisors considered using the atomic bombs to “impress the Soviets”? Regardless, wasn’t it preferable to avoid having an “Iron Curtain” between Honshu and Hokkaido, or between Japan and the Korean Peninsula? It is also alleged that several U.S. military leaders, including Nimitz, Eisenhower, Halsey, and possibly MacArthur, believed the use of the atomic bombs was unnecessary, as Japan was on the verge of surrender due to the blockade and conventional bombing—though Japan didn’t surrender until after the Imperial Conference following the Nagasaki bombing, when Emperor Hirohito intervened against protocol. Many revisionist views overlook Japan’s internal struggles in getting its militarist government to heed the Emperor’s decision on August 9-10th. They also fail to consider the impact of prolonging the war, even for a day, on the 70,000+ starving Allied POWs and Japan’s plans for them, had an invasion occurred.
There is a little bit of evidence that Jimmy Byrnes, Truman’s Secretary of State, wanted to use the bomb to intimidate the Russians. But the revisionists way overstate the case, and my book shows, step by step, as a narrative, that the bomb had dropped—twice—to make the Japanese surrender.
Can you share your take on the argument that the Soviet declaration of war on Japan and invasion of Manchuria on August 8 "convinced" Japan to surrender?
The Soviet invasion of Manchuria was a factor in the Japanese surrender, but the main factor was the two bombs. This is clear from the Japanese record.
I heard that there would have been more Japanese killed if war kept on than what the bomb killed?
In the end, the Allies allowed the Japanese Emperor to remain on the throne, so was it really an "unconditional" surrender as demanded by the Potsdam Declaration? Do you think it was wise decision to allow the Emperor to remain?
It was wise to allow the emperor to remain, even if that meant it was not really unconditional surrender. He helped unite Japan to accept defeat.
Who made the decisions on which Japanese officials, military or civilian were prosecuted after the surrender? Can you characterize how many Japanese were tried and convicted?
MacArthur, the Supreme Commander, was running the show with input from Washington. There were many trials all over Asia for Japanese atrocities, and something like a thousand Japanese commanders were hung. At the big trial in Tokyo, about twenty government leaders were convicted of the crime of making aggressive war (a bit broad!) and seven were hung. See Judgment at Tokyo by Gary Bass.
Why didn't we aim the bombs at the war facility rather than innocent civilians? If Japan had bombed our cities, to intentionally kill civilians, we would have called them "brutal savages.”
We did not have precision bombing. The bombs were aimed at the middle of the city.
Any stories about the aircrews that dropped the bombs? Tibbets remained convinced that we did the right thing. Others?
Tibbets remained convinced and so did most of the crews. There are some stories of mental health issues but not many.
Was Mussolini also involved in promoting collaboration with Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor?
No
Evan did you say more pilots died over Germany than Marines in the Pacific?
Yes, more airmen died in the attacks on Europe (about 38,000) than marines in the Pacific.
